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In the first known incident of its kind, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) received reports that a small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) caused the 
crash of an aircraft.  According to Yee (2018), a flight instructor and student aboard 
an R22 helicopter performing maneuvers near Daniel Island in Charleston, South 
Carolina, reported spotting a DJI Phantom approaching their airspace.  The 
instructor assumed control of the helicopter and attempted to perform an evasive 
maneuver to avoid the sUAS (Yee, 2018).  The maneuver, presumably performed 
at low altitude, caused the helicopter’s aft rotor to strike a tree, careening out of 
control and impacting the ground (Yee, 2018).  While the instructor and student did 
not sustain any injuries, the helicopter was determined to be a complete loss (Yee, 
2018). According to news sources, the operator of the unmanned aircraft had not 
yet been identified (Yee, 2018). If proven credible, this report would be ground-
shaking to the aviation industry and have a detrimental impact on UAS operations 
in the United States. This news comes in the very same week the FAA opened yet 
another investigation into a February 9, 2018, incident in which an unmanned 
aircraft allegedly struck a tour helicopter near the Hawaiian island of Kauai 
(Bernardo, 2018).   
  
 To experts, such occurrences should come as no surprise—several ‘red 
flags’ served as stark indicators suggesting UAS integration problems were getting 
worse, not better. These conditions underscore the applicability of Heinrich’s Law 
presented in Figure 1. Heinrich’s Law states that serious incidents or accidents are 
preceded by several minor incidents and a more substantial number of near-misses 
(Ward, n.d.; Johnson, 2011).  Based on the theory, reducing the number of near-
misses and minor incidents should invariably decrease the likelihood of a serious 
incident or accident (Ward, n.d.; Johnson, 2011). Conversely, several near-miss 
incidents or minor accidents may suggest underlying conditions are ripe for a major 
accident.   
 
 
Figure 1. Visual depiction of Heinrich’s Triangle.   
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Recent of Minor Accident Events 
 
Reports of encounters or outright collisions between unmanned aircraft and 
manned platforms are becoming increasingly common. The Daniel Island incident 
is in some ways reflective of a similar UAS encounter over New York. In mid-
2014, the New York Police Department alleged that a police helicopter encountered 
not one, but two small unmanned aircraft flying at 2,000 feet over the George 
Washington Bridge shortly after midnight on July 8 ("Two Drones," 2014).  
Reportedly, the helicopter "had to swerve to avoid a collision" ("Two Drones," 
2014, p. 1). In this case, however, the helicopter successfully evaded both 
unmanned aircraft.    
 
Perhaps the most notable incident occurred on September 21, 2017, when a 
United States Army UH-60M Black Hawk helicopter was struck by an unmanned 
aircraft while performing a routine, low-altitude formation flight near Staten Island, 
New York (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2017). The midair 
collision caused damage to the helicopter’s main rotor blade (see Figure 2), as well 
as lodging several fragments of the sUAS in the helicopter’s fuselage (NTSB, 
2017).  Recovery of an electrical motor component from the destroyed sUAS 
allowed investigators to corroborate the collision and aided in identifying the sUAS 
operator by correlating the unique serial number stamped on the recovered 
wreckage with manufacturer sales records (NTSB, 2017).  The NTSB (2017) 
determined the sUAS operator’s failure to “see and avoid the helicopter,” and 
intentional violation of visual line of sight rules caused the incident (p. 1).   
 
 
Figure 2. Main rotor damage to UH-60M Black Hawk helicopter, September 21, 
2017.  (Public domain image retrieved from https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/60500-
60999/60650/610458.pdf) 
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 The Black Hawk accident follows on the heels of several similar, but less 
severe encounters. On September 13, 2017, Fire Spotter Bradley Goldman 
suspected an unmanned aircraft struck his Rockwell Twin Commander while 
operating at low altitude near Newport, Oregon (Mortimer, 2017). The incident, 
which is presumably still under investigation, caused minor damage to the leading 
edge of one of the aircraft's airfoils (Mortimer, 2017).  The presence of plastic leads 
to the suspicion that the impact was not the result of a bird strike, but rather a strike 
from a UAS (Mortimer, 2017).   
 
According to the Flight Safety Foundation's Aviation Safety Network 
(2018) database, unmanned aircraft--including RC aircraft--are suspected or have 
been confirmed to have been involved in 14 midair collisions around the world 
since 2015. Eight of those incidents occurred within the United States.   
  
Serious UAS accidents are not limited solely to the United States.  On 
October 12, 2017, a Canadian SkyJet King Air-100 turboprop flying from Rouyn-
Noranda Airport struck an unmanned aircraft while enroute to Jean-Lesage Airport, 
Quebec (Transportation Safety Board of Canada [TSB], 2017). On final approach 
to the destination airport, the Sky Jet crew reported spotting a small oncoming 
drone “about the size of a dinner plate” (TSB, 2017, p. 1).  The UAS struck the top 
leading edge of the left wing, destroying the drone and leaving a dent and several 
minor scratches on the wing surface (TSB, 2017).  Investigators did not find any 
UAS wreckage and were unable to identify the UAS operator (TSB, 2017). 
Unmanned aircraft are also suspected to be involved in several other midair 
collisions, including a Linhas Aereas de Mozambique (LAM) Boeing 737-700 in 
January 2017 near Tete Mozambique (Jansen, 2017).       
 
Rising UAS Close Encounters & Sightings 
 
The alarming rise in UAS midair collisions and incidents are paralleled by 
an increasing number of UAS sightings by manned aircraft crewmembers.  It should 
be noted that not every sighting is necessarily a hazardous event--many sightings 
likely involve UAS operators that are following established regulations.  
Unfortunately, a portion of those sighting incidents involves near-midair collisions 
or close encounters, UAS incursions into protected airspace around airports, or 
otherwise present hazards for manned aircraft.  In 2016, the FAA received 1,762 
reports of UAS sightings by aircrew members, an average of nearly 147 incidents 
each month (FAA, 2017).  Initially-released figures from 2017 reveal a substantial 
climb in the number of UAS sighting reports to 1,696 in first nine months of the 
year—an average of 188 UAS sightings per month (FAA, 2017). Based on the 
3
Wallace et al.: Building Evidence the FAA's UAS Safety Strategy Needs Improvement
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018
results presented in Figure 3, it is relatively easy to see a steadily-increasing, annual 
climb in the number of reported UAS sightings.  Generally, UAS sightings peak 
during the April to September months and diminish between October and March, 
likely due to favorable seasonal weather conditions. 
 
 
Figure 3. Reported UAS Sightings by month, November 2014-September 2017.  
Adapted from https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_sightings_report/. 
 
The aforementioned safety implications are exacerbated by recently 
completed research into UAS collision severity. In a report commissioned by the 
FAA through the Alliance for System Safety of UAS through Research Excellence 
(ASSURE) initiative, researchers assessed aircraft damage potential caused by an 
airborne collision with a small unmanned aircraft system (2017a).  During the 
study, researchers evaluated potential damage caused by a small 2.7 lb UAS 
impacting the structural components of typical commercial transport and business 
jet aircraft at a speed of 250 knots (ASSURE, 2017a).  Researchers concluded that 
“Quadcopter UAS impacts are likely to cause more damage than bird strikes with 
an equivalent initial kinetic energy” (ASSURE, 2017a, p. 215).  Researchers cited 
the density and structural rigidity of UAS components as the primary reason for 
this conclusion, stating “impact and consequent perforations exacerbated 
subsequent impact damage as other high-density UAS components (i.e., battery) 
impacted the underlying aircraft structure causing progressively more structural 
damage” (ASSURE, 2017a, p. 215). In a parallel study of aircraft collision potential 
with fixed-wing UAS platforms, researchers reached similar conclusions, 
remarking that unmanned aircraft strikes caused more severe damage than bird 
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strikes of equivalent energy due in large part to their rigid composition (ASSURE, 
2017b).  
 
Discussion 
 
 To accurately assess these indicators, one must evaluate them within the 
context of UAS integration policy.  According to the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA)(PL 112-95), Congress charged the Department of 
Transportation with developing a “phased-in approach to the integration of civil 
unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system” as well as “safely 
designate airspace for integrated manned and unmanned flight operations in the 
national airspace system” (FMRA, 2012, Sec 332).   
 
 Congressional emphasis on integration is a key framework, prominently 
featured throughout the legislative language throughout the FMRA.  To integrate 
means “to combine into one unified system or desegregate” (“Integrate,” n.d.).  In 
other words, Congress specifically intended for unmanned aircraft operators to 
become equal and full users of the National Airspace System—to the same extent, 
degree, and privilege as those flying manned aircraft. In the sixth year following 
the passage of PL 112-95, unmanned aircraft are still largely segregated from vast 
swaths of airspace. Perhaps more frustrating is that even in areas where integration 
has proceeded, policies have still favored segregation tactics.  When establishing 
the Small Unmanned Aircraft Rule later codified into 14 CFR §107, the FAA 
established a vertical limit of 400 feet AGL because “most manned aircraft 
operations take place higher than 500 feet” (Operation and Certification of Small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems [sUAS], 2016, p. 42116).  In response to altitude 
limitation, the agency stated (Operation and Certification of sUAS, 2016):  
 
Allowing unrestricted small unmanned aircraft to operate at high 
altitude without the benefit of additional equipment (for example 
transponders and altimeters) and the provision of air traffic services 
introduces a significant threat of collision to manned aircraft 
operating in the NAS. (p. 42116) 
 
 Perhaps not surprisingly, stakeholders representing low altitude aircraft 
operations, such as helicopters and agricultural applicators advocated in favor of 
the restriction, with some pushing for even lower altitude limits for sUAS, although 
these recommendations were not adopted into the final rulemaking (Operation and 
Certification of sUAS, 2016).   
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When employed in concert with rules derived from 14 CFR § 91.119, 
Minimum Safe Altitudes, one can see why such policies were initially 
implemented.  According to 14 CFR § 91.119, except takeoff or landing, pilots are 
limited to operating aircraft no closer than 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle 
within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet over congested areas such as towns, 
settlements or open congregations of people.  Over uncongested areas, pilots are 
limited to operating no closer than 500 feet to people, vessels, vehicles, or 
structures.  One should admire the logic of this design.  As presented in Figure 4, 
one can easily see vertical and lateral buffers that have been engineered to protect 
sUAS from manned aircraft.   
 
 
Figure 4. Minimum Safe Altitudes (14 CFR § 91.119) and sUAS Operating 
Limitations (14 CFR § 107.51).  Note: diagram does not take into account 
additional sUAS flight restrictions imposed by airspace class (14 CFR § 107.41), 
operations in the vicinity of airports (14 CFR § 107.43), or other prohibited or 
restricted areas (14 CFR § 107.45).  
 
 It should come as very little surprise that helicopters and other low-flying 
aircraft have borne the brunt of recent collisions or near-misses with unmanned 
aircraft—such events are occurring in the only airspace that has genuinely been 
integrated.   
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Conclusions 
 
 UAS operations in surface and low-altitude class B, C, D, and E airspaces 
have mainly been segregated from other manned aircraft operations. The issuance 
of Certificates of Authorization or Waivers under FMRA Section 333 and 334, as 
well as airspace waivers granted under 14 CFR § 107.205(h),  have largely 
segregated sUAS operations from manned aircraft operations. Indeed, this 
approach is probably appropriate in the short term considering the lack of 
infrastructure development for identification and tracking of small unmanned 
aircraft. Within areas of airspace integration, however, the aforementioned safety 
indicators suggest that the progression of successful, safe sUAS integration policies 
has not yet been achieved. The careful balance of existing operations in the National 
Airspace System seems much more fragile than originally suspected, which may 
suggest further sUAS policy adjustment may be in order.  Furthermore, additional 
14 CFR § 91 modifications may be appropriate to address the evolving nature of 
shared airspace between manned and unmanned aircraft.   
 
 Hopefully, new efforts such as the Low Altitude Authorization and 
Notification Capability (LAANC) and UAS Detection Initiative will yield fruitful 
results in aiding the FAA in safely progressing UAS integration (FAA, 2018; FAA, 
2016). Perhaps most importantly, the agency cannot ignore trending safety 
indicators, which seem to suggest that as unmanned aircraft operations within the 
NAS increase, so too are the number of safety hazards. Left unmitigated, such 
hazards will yield inevitably predictable results.   
 
While the UAS industry clamors for more operational autonomy, it is 
essential to consider that UAS integration is not on schedule—as an industry, we 
still have much to learn about how to safely and effectively entwine UAS within 
the complex system of systems that make up the NAS. 
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